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Abstract 
Over 330 million people live in India‘s 5,165 cities, with 35 cities having a population of 
over a million. Three (Mumbai, Delhi, and Kolkata) of the 10 largest metropolises in the 
world are in India. Over two-thirds of GDP originates in urban agglomerations in the 
country. However, urban governance and finance in India leave much to be desired in 
terms of providing services to the country‘s burgeoning urban population and with 
respect to its flexibility in accommodating different needs and pressures and its lack of 
resiliency in adapting to shocks, whether natural or manmade. This paper draws on 
lessons from fiscal federalism theory and experiences of governance institutions and 
financing systems around the world to identify some key reforms needed to ensure more 
citizen participation and greater accountability in urban governance, and to augment and 
strengthen the capacity of Indian cities to deliver more adequate services and provide 
needed urban infrastructure. 
Keywords: India; metropolitan areas; governance; finance 
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India‘s rapid economic expansion over the last few decades since the loosening of the so-
called ―license raj‖—the constricting deadweight of licensing, regulation, and red tape 
that had long held back private sector development—has been impressive. Moreover, the 
country has managed to sustain a respectable performance in the face of such major 
economic crises as the recent financial meltdown. India‘s private sector is clearly alive, 
well, and capable of even better things in the future. Unfortunately, it is not so clear that 
the country‘s expanding urban public sector is equally able to cope with the economic, 
demographic, and environmental changes that continue to confront it. This paper 
considers some aspects of the governance and finance reforms needed to make India‘s 
burgeoning cities better places for those who live in them, for those who are going to 
move into them in the future, and for the country as a whole. To cope adequately with the 
changes that have already occurred, let alone those that loom ahead, India‘s cities need to 
be freed from what might perhaps be called the ―urban raj‖—the archaic and well-
entrenched institutional structure that restricts what they can do and provides few 
incentives for them to do it well.  
Section 1 of the paper outlines why turning India‘s cities into ―engines of growth‖ 
is a necessary ingredient of future growth, a feat that requires reforming and 
strengthening local governance structures. Similarly, local finances must be strengthened 
to provide adequate finance for the provision of services and to ensure that the money 
spent results in desired outputs and outcomes. Section 2 sets out some important 
preconditions for efficient governance systems and finance drawn from the theory of 
fiscal federalism. Against this background, Section 3 outlines the present inadequate 
urban governance structure in India, concluding that major efforts are needed to equip 
India‘s cities with a governance structure capable of responding flexibly and adequately 
to the changing realities they face. Section 4 discusses the problems arising from 
ambiguity and overlap in expenditure assignment and weaknesses in public financial 
management. The next three sections turn to the revenue side of the budget. Section 5 
considers how to make local taxes and user charges more adequate to finance local public 
services while ensuring efficiency and accountability. Section 6 considers the role of 
transfers and suggests some reforms. Section 7 turns to the critical issue of infrastructure 
finance through such means as local borrowing, development charges, land sales, or 
public-private partnerships. Section 8 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
1. The Need for Urban Dynamism 
 
Cities are the leading edge of economic dynamism in every country. They create 
agglomeration economies for enterprises, generating externalities that facilitate 
transactions, production, and distribution activities. They also facilitate productive 
interaction of people from various walks of life, resulting in the exchange of ideas and a 
climate for creative activity that leads to both innovation and productivity gains. In 
particular, large metropolitan areas provide scope to achieve the critical mass required to 
attain high degrees of specialization in labour, knowledge and businesses, services, 
infrastructure, institutions, and media, all of which increase economic dynamism and 
growth (Bird and Slack 2007).  
 Coping with Change: The Need to Restructure Urban Governance and Finance in India 3 
 
However, the extent to which cities succeed in realizing these potentials depends 
in large part on whether they provide a properly enabling environment. For example, to 
give agglomeration economies full scope requires the sustained provision of a wide range 
of urban public services that promote both private sector activities and the well-being of 
the urban population, such as water, sewers, garbage collection and disposal, drainage 
systems, police and fire protection, and transportation. To do this well requires good 
policies and high-quality public institutions. Similarly, attracting the knowledge workers 
needed to create and maintain a social environment that facilitates creative social and 
economic interaction requires policies that accommodate diverse cultures (including 
outsiders) as well as such quality of life factors as high-quality schools and health care 
facilities, social and cultural activities, recreational opportunities, and safe and strong 
neighbourhoods. Cities must accommodate not just such key workers, of course, but all 
those who make the city work, including new migrants and others working in 
construction and other essential activities  who often need affordable housing and in 
many cases some social assistance. Underlying all this, a ―good‖ city needs a political 
and governance system that can respond to the changing requirements and needs of its 
people swiftly, flexibly, and efficiently.  
None of these conditions is easy to satisfy in India, a country in which over 330 
million people live in 5,165 urban areas, which has 35 cities with over a million people, 
as well as three of the largest metropolises in the world (Mumbai, Delhi, and Kolkata). 
India‘s urban population has been growing at an annual rate of 2.7 per cent and, although 
overall population growth is expected to decelerate, the urban population will continue to 
grow at about 2.5 per cent over the next two decades (Ramanathan and Dasgupta 2009). 
The urban sector presently contributes about two-thirds of GDP and this share is likely to 
increase to 75 per cent by 2021 (India 2008). India‘s cities are thus many, large, 
economically important, and growing. Ensuring that they will be able to meet the 
challenges they face will not be easy.  
Demands for better infrastructure and public services in India‘s urban areas are 
large and growing. However, the resources available to urban local governments are 
clearly inadequate to serve even their present population. For example, Mohanty et al. 
(2007) found that, on average, for the period 1999–2000 to 2003–04 actual spending in 
30 large municipal corporations
2
 in India was only about 24 per cent of the (inflation-
adjusted) requirements set almost a half a century ago by the Zakaria Committee (India 
1963), with the extent of under-spending by this measure being over 75 per cent in 17 
municipal corporations, and over 50 per cent in all of them but three—Pune, Nagpur, and 
Nasik, where the deficit was only about 30–35 per cent. At the other extreme, spending in 
the Patna Municipal Corporation was estimated to be less than 6 per cent of the Zakaria 
norm, with other municipal corporations in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh almost equally badly 
off. Recent analysis by the Planning Commission shows that 34 per cent of urban 
households do not have water taps within their premises, 26 per cent of them do not have 
toilets, 70 per cent of waste is not treated before disposal, and untreated sewerage and 
unregulated discharge from industries is a major source of water pollution (India 2008). 
In total, only 63 per cent of the urban population had access to sewerage and sanitation 
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facilities in 2004. Urban transportation problems are similarly acute. Public transportation 
is congested and inefficient; even those who can afford private transportation on average 
travel only one kilometre in 15 minutes owing to road congestion. Housing too is 
problematic, with almost 21 per cent of the urban population living in squatter 
settlements. Indian cities are in bad shape. 
With urbanization proceeding at a fast pace, all these problems are likely to 
worsen in the near future. Ramanathan and Dasgupta (2009) estimate the cumulative 
capital investment requirements for providing services at 2007 prices for the period 
2006–31 at over Rs.71 trillion. When operating expenditures of around Rs.10 trillion are 
taken into account, the total expenditure required amounts to over Rs.3 trillion, or about 
25 per cent of the consolidated revenue of central and state governments. Exponentially 
growing urban public service requirements simply cannot be financed from the present 
urban local tax base, which in most cases consists essentially of the property tax. At one 
time, some states allowed municipal governments to levy a tax on the entry of goods into 
a local area for consumption, use, or sale (octroi). Although this tax was distortionary and 
inefficient, it provided a buoyant source of local revenues. Now, however, nearly all 
states have abolished this tax. Indeed, a few states have gone even further to ensure the 
inadequacy of urban local public finance by abolishing the residential property tax. 
Elsewhere, urban local bodies have proved unable (or unwilling) to help themselves by 
adequately revising property values, thus ensuring stagnancy or even decline in their own 
revenues. Transfers from the states to municipal governments are of little help, because 
they are inadequate and ad hoc and poorly designed. The absence of a debt market for 
local government bonds makes financing infrastructure even more difficult. In the 
absence of major reforms in both governance and finance, the prospects for Indian cities 
do not look good 
  
2. Lessons from Theory 
 
The traditional theory of fiscal federalism, assuming  a welfare-maximizing government, 
demonstrates the welfare gains from fiscal decentralization by matching public service 
provision with the varied preferences of people living in different jurisdictions. In one 
formulation, people ―vote with their feet‖ by moving to localities providing public 
service tax mixes that closely matches their preferences (Tiebout 1956). However, the 
unrealistic nature of this assumption of mobility as well as the information asymmetry 
relating to public services and tax mix in different localities limits the applicability of this 
model to real world situations. An alternative formulation is the ―decentralization 
theorem,‖ which states that ―… in the absence of cost savings from the centralized 
provision of a (local public) good and of inter-jurisdictional externalities, the level of 
welfare will always be at least as high (and typically higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of 
consumption are provided in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of 
consumption is maintained across all jurisdictions‖ (Oates 1972, 54). The welfare gains 
from decentralization are larger when variations in demand are greater and where the 
demand for local services is relatively inelastic. The ability of a centralized system to 
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cater to diverse preferences is limited by information asymmetry and political constraints 
(Oates 1999).  
The so-called second generation theories (SGT) of fiscal federalism assume that 
agents within governments (bureaucrats and politicians) attempt to maximize their own 
welfare function within a constellation of incentives and constraints shaped by the 
characteristics of the prevailing fiscal and political institutions (Oates 2008). One SGT 
approach applies industrial organization theories to fiscal federalism and analyses 
multilevel fiscal arrangements in terms of the principal-agent framework (Seabright 
1996). A second approach, motivated partly by the fiscal crisis in several Latin American 
countries precipitated in part at least by an incentive structure that led to the excessive 
exploitation of the ―fiscal commons‖ by subnational governments, applies Kornai‘s 
(1986) ―soft budget constraint‖ (Rodden et al. 2003). A third SGT approach employs 
more formal political economy approaches based, for example, on legislative structure 
and electoral process to analyse different kinds of fiscal outcomes under centralized and 
decentralized politics. For example, the outcomes emerging from so-called ―yardstick 
competition‖ are analysed under the rubric of ―competitive federalism‖ by Breton (1996). 
All these approaches are not intended to replace the traditional theory of fiscal federalism 
but to complement and extend it. 
  An important precondition for efficient provision of public services is clarity in 
the assignment of functions (expenditure responsibilities) to each level of government. 
Who does what should depend upon the benefit span of the public service in question, the 
extent of diversity in demand for the service, the technology available for its efficient 
provision, and the capacity of the jurisdiction to provide the service. Functions need to be 
clearly assigned to ensure responsiveness and accountability. In a democratic polity, the 
elected executive should have the overall decision-making powers for public service 
provision, and the role of the bureaucracy should be to implement the decisions taken by 
the executive. Even when the basic assignment system is clear, however, some 
overlapping is almost inevitable so it is important to establish clear institutional lines of 
authority.   
Assignment of financial powers should be adequate to finance the functions 
assigned. Accountability of governments to local residents can best be achieved when the 
residents of the jurisdiction bear the cost of providing the services at least at the margin. 
Hence, local governments must have powers to raise revenues from the residents to 
finance the public services consumed by them. Ensuring a strong ―Wicksellian‖ link 
(Breton 1996) between revenue and expenditure decisions at the margin is critical to 
ensure that urban governments take rational decisions and are accountable to the residents 
for their decisions.  
Local governments generally provide a mix of private and public goods. In 
principle, user charges covering the cost of provision should be paid by those who benefit 
directly from the private goods provided. Similarly, the cost of public services benefiting 
the people in the jurisdiction as a whole should be collected from taxes on the residents. 
On the other hand, when service benefits spill over to other jurisdictions, it is often 
appropriate for them to be partly paid for through transfers. Local governments may 
obviously levy taxes on immobile bases such as real property. In addition, the benefit 
principle suggests that they may, to a limited extent, be permitted to impose taxes on 
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mobile bases, although such powers must be bestowed with care to avoid encouraging 
shifting the cost of local services to non-residents (Bird and Smart 2010). 
Intergovernmental transfers play an important role in local public service 
provision. In the traditional approach, higher-level governments should levy all broad 
based redistributive taxes since they have a comparative advantage in carrying out 
redistributive and stabilization functions. On the other hand, considerable expenditure 
responsibility is properly assigned to lower-level governments for efficiency reasons. The 
resulting vertical imbalance between expenditures and revenues at each level is generally 
corrected through transfers from the higher to lower levels. Within each level of 
subnational government, some jurisdictions will inevitably suffer some fiscal disability 
owing to such factors as below average revenue capacity and higher unit costs of 
providing public services. Differences in these factors create different net fiscal benefits 
in different jurisdictions and may thus induce inefficient factor movements (Buchanan 
1950). This problem may be exacerbated when subnational governments impose origin-
based taxes (Boadway and Flatters 1982). The solution to such inefficiencies is, again, 
usually considered to reside in appropriate intergovernmental fiscal transfers. In principle, 
such balance-restoring  (or gap-closing) transfers are intended to enable every jurisdiction 
to provide comparable levels of services at comparable tax rates should be unconditional 
(Bird and Smart 2002). However, there is also often a case for providing specific purpose 
transfers to ensure minimum standards of public services with significant inter-
jurisdictional externalities. In this case, the appropriate transfer design should often 
require the recipient governments to comply with specific conditions.  
 
In practice, it is difficult to incorporate all these principles in designing the 
transfer system. There is, for example, no completely objective way to measure the 
degree of vertical or horizontal imbalance (Bird and Tarasov 2004). Similarly, with 
respect to specific purpose transfers, it is impossible as a rule to measure the degree of 
externalities and hence to develop optimal cost-sharing arrangements or matching ratios. 
Since the economic argument for decentralization is based to some extent on asymmetric 
information in terms of the inability of the central government to estimate the correct 
degree of spillovers, it is somewhat ironic that the proper design of specific purpose 
transfers requires exactly such information. As Inman (2003) shows for the U.S., 
matching ratios in practice never correspond to the extent of spillovers and the federal 
share is invariably much higher than spillovers. Finally, even if all the conceptual and 
empirical problems inherent in designing an economically optimal transfer system could 
be overcome, invariably non-economic (including political) objectives creep in and 
ensure that the actual transfer system differs from the ideal. 
  
 Moreover, some have even questioned whether intergovernmental transfers are a 
good idea in any case. Transfers inevitably soften the budget constraint and have been 
argued to undermine fiscal discipline and promote fiscal irresponsibility and 
macroeconomic instability (Prud‘homme 1995). Equalising transfers given to offset fiscal 
disadvantages can interfere with the normal process of income convergence which occurs 
in the process of economic growth as labour and capital move from places with lower 
productivity to those with higher productivity. Specific purpose transfers may not 
effectively encourage local expenditures on the desired function owing to the fungibility 
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of funds. For these and other reasons, transfers may harm rather than further the 
achievement of efficiency and even equity goals.  
 
Nonetheless, substantial transfers exist in every multilevel fiscal system. It is not 
possible to perfectly match revenue powers with expenditure responsibilities, so an 
appropriate design principle is for transfers to be neither so large as to turn local 
governments into simple agents of higher-level governments or make them unduly 
transfer-dependent and hence fiscally irresponsible, nor so small as to render them 
incapable of providing minimal local services to their residents. One key way to set a 
hard budget constraint is to ensure that richer local governments are as self-financing as 
possible and that even the poorest local governments have sufficient revenue flexibility 
so that revenue and expenditure decisions are matched at the margin in the sense that any 
local decision to expand expenditure must be financed through additional local taxation 
(Bird and Vaillancourt 1998). Further, both central and state governments must be careful 
not to bail out bad local decisions by expanding transfers. The system of grants must be 
transparent, predictable, and essentially ―infra-marginal‖ for any particular budgetary 
period so that local governments do not have incentives to free-ride.  
 
To satisfy the conditions of what Weingast (1995, 2009) calls ―market-preserving 
federalism‖ (in the sense of maintaining an open national market), local governments 
must face a hard budget constraint as a result of properly designed and implemented 
expenditure and revenue systems. In addition, efforts must be made to strengthen and 
deepen markets, particularly land and capital markets, by removing impediments to 
mobility and trade in factors and products such as laws restricting markets and 
institutional rigidities. Similarly, efficient credit and debt markets and a well-developed 
banking system along with credible credit rating institutions are important preconditions 
to avoid bail outs. If intergovernmental competition is to result in gains in terms of 
efficient service delivery let alone and innovation and productivity gains, it is important 
to institute proper checks against destabilizing (predatory) competition as well as against 
restrictive and protectionist policies. All these issues become particularly important in the 
context of globalization because localities with better linkage to markets and 
infrastructure can reap higher benefits from access to domestic and international markets 
and grow faster than those less well off in these respects. Finally, in case something goes 
badly wrong in some locality it is also essential to develop institutions that can handle 
local fiscal crises and even, in the extreme, bankruptcy. None of the tasks assigned to 
policy makers by the fiscal federalism literature is easy and few, if any, are facilitated by 
India‘s current structure of urban governance and finance. 
 
3. Urban Governance in India 
 
Economically dynamic cities need governance structures that elicit preferences for public 
services, ensure responsiveness in the provision of such services, provide accessibility to 
citizens, and achieve cost savings by adopting an appropriate scale of operation. Bird and 
Slack (2007) discuss several alternative models for governing large metropolitan areas 
and conclude that no unique model of governance fits all municipalities or even the same 
municipality at different times. In fact, in recent years, a number of major cities have 
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changed their governance model. Toronto (Canada) moved from a fragmented one-tier 
structure to a two-tier structure and then to a consolidated single-tier structure. On the 
other hand, London (UK) moved from a two-tier structure to a one-tier structure and then 
back to a two-tier structure. Cape Town (South Africa) moved from having no metro 
government at all to a two-tier and then a consolidated one-tier metropolitan structure. 
What is right for any city is seldom clear, and may change over time. In larger 
metropolitan areas, however, the real choice is usually between one-tier or two-tier 
governance structures perhaps supplemented by some voluntary inter-municipal co-
operative agreements or specialized agencies to provide particular public services.  
 
An important governance issue in India concerns the need to distinguish large 
metropolitan cities from smaller municipalities. In metropolitan cities, the concentration 
of a variety of economic activities, the cosmopolitan composition of population, and 
large-scale migration requires a system of public service provision that not only 
facilitates economic activities but also promotes the social interaction and cohesion 
necessary to facilitate innovation and impart dynamism. However, how large 
metropolitan cities are actually governed may deviate substantially from this mandate in 
response to the compulsions of local politics, especially when they are state capitals. 
Restrictive protectionist policies responding to pressures to provide employment to local 
population, preferences for local population in business dealings and contracts, and 
preferences based on linguistic, ethnic, and other considerations may rob cities of their 
metropolitan character. A possible way to free large cities from such state political 
pressures may be remove them from the control of the state governments and create 
separate city-states as China has done for several very large cities, most recently 
Chongqing. Germany, for example, has three such city-states, including Berlin. Other 
countries—the United States, Australia, Mexico, and Brazil, for example—have created 
special capital city districts, as has India. However, as Indian experience with New Delhi 
shows, being special and separate provides at best only a partial answer to the financial 
and governance problems facing large, rapidly growing cities in India (Mathur 2009), so 
we do not discuss such approaches further here.  
 
Even within a one-tier structure, of course, governance in large cities is far from 
simple. In Shanghai, for instance, there are three levels of management—municipal, 
district, and sub-district. In Mumbai, which has been characterized as a ―fragmented one-
tier structure‖ (Slack 2007, 15), matters are more complicated. Mumbai has seven wards, 
each with its own municipal officials, and the surrounding eastern and western suburbs 
are also divided into wards. Within the Mumbai urban agglomeration, in addition to the 
municipal corporations of Mumbai, Kalyan, and New Mumbai, there are many other 
governing bodies, including the Mumbai Regional Development Authority, 16 municipal 
towns, 7 non-municipal urban areas, and 995 villages. In addition, management of urban 
services in Mumbai is divided further still among the Municipal Corporation of Greater 
Mumbai, the state of Maharashtra, and the Government of India. For example, the urban 
rail network is run by Indian Railways.  
  
In a two-tier model, the lower tier is responsible for providing services having 
smaller geographical spread while the upper tier provides services with a larger 
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geographical spread as well as those involving significant economies of scale. This model 
has some characteristics that make it suitable for large metropolitan regions. Examples 
may be found, for instance, in Madrid (Spain), Santiago (Chile), and Manila (Philippines). 
Two-tier structures already exist in many Indian cities. For example, Hyderabad 
Municipal Corporation has 11 municipalities, Chennai Municipal Corporation has 36 
municipalities, and Kolkata has 41 municipalities within its area (Bandyopadhyay and 
Rao 2009). In principle, the two-tier model may have potential advantages over the one-
tier model owing to its greater responsiveness, efficiency, and accountability. Some 
redistribution is also possible in this structure through a combination of tax and spending 
decisions. On the other hand, there may be overlap and duplication in the provision of 
services. Moreover, since the structure is less transparent, residents may be confused as to 
who is actually responsible for which services. 
 
In addition, in India as in other countries, a number of specialized agencies for 
providing water supply, waste management, and transportation across a number of 
municipalities exist. This approach has a number of advantages. For example, specialized 
agencies can reap economies of scale and address the issue of spillovers, can be 
professionally managed to ensure efficiency and can, to at least some extent, establish 
and collect user charges without political considerations. On the other hand, there are 
disadvantages. There may, for instance, be problems of coordination when a number of 
specialized agencies providing different services are involved. In addition, these agencies 
may have no local political accountability unless their decisions are subject to the 
approval by the municipal executive. Furthermore, if municipal taxes go to support such 
agencies without a clear linkage between the expenditure decisions of the specialized 
agencies and the taxes collected by the municipalities, the absence of the ―Wicksellian 
connection‖ between revenues and expenditures further reduces accountability. 
Specialized agencies can certainly improve efficiency in the delivery of some services, 
but if they are not locally accountable, it is far from clear that they will supply the right 
services in the right places.  
 
Effective fiscal decentralization requires that not only must appropriate functions 
and adequate finances be devolved to the local governments, but so must control over 
those they employ. In Indian cities, the primary responsibilities are vested in an executive 
mayor chosen by elected representatives, and local officials are charged with 
implementing the decisions taken by the executive. In practice, however, the role of the 
mayor (or chairperson) as the executive head of the municipality is often confused with 
that of the Municipal Commissioner—an official appointed by the state government who 
is supposed to implement the policies approved by the executive. Since the local 
government has no role whatsoever in the appointment, promotion, or transfer of the 
Municipal Commissioner, it is hardly surprising that this official is, in reality, primarily 
accountable to the state government rather than to the elected local representatives. In 
addition to this confusion at the top, governance in most smaller municipalities also 
suffers from inadequate administrative capacity to plan, effectively regulate, raise 
revenues, and implement spending decisions. Moreover, both state and central politicians, 
in varying degrees in different regions, often interfere in the functioning of municipalities. 
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The Expert Committee on the Governance in Bangalore Metropolitan Region 
(Report of the Expert Committee 2004) recommended that the Commissioner of the 
Greater Bangalore Municipal Corporation should be selected by a committee constituted 
by the state in consultation with the mayor and, more importantly, that the 
commissioner‘s role should be legislatively redefined to make him/her clearly responsible 
and accountable to the mayor and the corporation. If India‘s larger cities are to have 
effective urban governance structures, similar steps need to be taken by all state 
governments to make the commissioners in municipal corporations and municipalities 
primarily responsible and accountable to the respective municipal bodies. Of course, so 
long as the commissioner‘s career path remains essentially in the state bureaucracy, some 
problem of ―dual subordination‖ (to both central and local authorities) still remains. but, 
at a minimum, it is critical that the chief municipal officer should clearly be primarily 
accountable to the municipality he or she serves rather than to the state, as is now the case.  
 
The Constitution makes urban governance structures a matter to be determined by 
the states. Although the 74
th
 amendment accorded constitutional recognition to municipal 
bodies, by and large the present urban governance structures have carried over from the 
past. To strengthen participatory planning, the Constitutional amendment provided for the 
setting up of Metropolitan Planning Committees to prepare the draft development plan in 
every metropolitan area and similar District Planning Committees (DPCs) to consolidate 
and co-ordinate planning for urban areas. In addition, the constitutional amendment 
mandated the holding of Ward Sabhas (assemblies) to elicit the preferences of the people 
for public services and to develop planning from the grassroots level. However, none of 
these requirements were really observed in practice until the national Planning 
Commission finally mandated the setting up of DPCs (India 2005). Despite this mandate, 
urban local bodies in most states do not as yet have regular Ward Sabhas and, even when 
they exist, these assemblies are not used either for urban planning or for eliciting the 
preferences for public services. Similarly, many states are yet to legislate for, let alone 
create, the required Metropolitan Planning Committees. 
 
 The issue of governance in India‘s major metropolitan areas is extremely 
important not only for the millions who live there but also for the economic development 
of the country as a whole. Big cities need a sound governance structure that works well. 
To attain this, much more effort is needed to implement the ways of revealing citizen 
preferences through the  citizen access structures (such as Ward Sabhas and the various 
planning committees)  set out in the Constitution. Even more importantly, the roles that 
different political and bureaucratic actors are supposed to play at the municipal level need 
to be set out more clearly; and then these officials should be permitted to do their jobs 
with far less interference from politicians at higher levels of government and with 
primary accountability to those whom they are supposed to serve—local residents. Until 
the basic urban governance structure is moved in these directions, Indian cities are, for 
the most part, going to continue to be unable to respond flexibly or adequately to the 
changing realities with which they are confronted.  
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4. What Do Urban Local Governments Do? 
 
Traditional fiscal federalism theory argues that the essential function of local 
governments is allocative. The potential mobility of economic agents reduces the 
effectiveness of local governments in carrying out redistribution. Similarly, the openness 
of local economies means that they can do little in terms of stabilization (Oates 1972). 
The main task of the local governments is thus to provide local goods and services within 
the area under their jurisdictions.
3
 Except when overridden by distributive considerations, 
efficiency requires that local governments should levy user charges on those who benefit 
from the private goods that they provide, such as water supply, sewerage, transportation, 
and recreation services—. Similarly, local public services benefiting the local population 
in general should be financed by taxing residents, while services whose benefits spill over 
jurisdictional boundaries usually need to be financed in part by intergovernmental 
transfers. Finally, borrowing is, in principle, the best way to finance large capital 
investments that will continue to provide services long into the future. Of course, it is 
important to ensure that neither transfers nor borrowing turn into bailouts that soften the 
budget constraint facing local government decision-makers.  
 Three key points should be noted about the 18 functions constitutionally devolved 
to municipal bodies in India. First, the functions listed are identical for all types of 
municipal bodies—whether huge metropolitan cities or small urban localities. Second, 
since the extent to which these functions are actually devolved is at the discretion of state 
governments, the extent of devolution may vary significantly across states. Third, most 
states are reluctant to devolve functions to municipal governments in part because they 
argue that they do not have the capacity to undertake them. In addition, because most 
listed ―municipal‖ items are either in the constitution‘s list of state functions or in the 
concurrent list of state and central functions, there is not only considerable concurrency 
and overlap between states and municipalities but also between the central government 
and municipal bodies. Assigning responsibility for the provision of specific services to a 
specified level of government and ensuring that those who make the decisions are 
adequately accountable for their actions is thus difficult. This problem is particularly 
acute in the capital cities of the states where the overlap in functions between the state 
government and the municipal corporation makes the system particularly opaque.
4
  
 
  In principle, there is nothing wrong with concurrent assignment of powers if 
there is clear demarcation of functional domains. However, no state has yet taken the 
initiative to undertake so-called  ―activity mapping‖ for municipal governments necessary 
                                                 
3
 This does not mean that local governments do not have any role in redistributive or stabilization functions. 
Local governments sometimes have local employment programs (Inman and Rubinfeld 1997) and may also 
play a role in implementing anti-poverty interventions (Rao and Das-Gupta 1995; Rao 2002). 
4
 In Delhi, the overlapping problem is even more acute as all the three levels of government—centre, the 
Union Territory of Delhi and three municipal bodies (the Delhi Municipal Corporation, New Delhi 
Municipal Committee, and Delhi Cantonment)—divide the powers among them in confusing ways (Mathur 
2009). 
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to know precisely who is responsible for doing exactly what with sufficient clarity to 
achieve efficiency and accountability in the provision of urban local services.
5
 Although 
about all most state governments have done is to formalise the functions that were being 
carried on by the various municipal bodies even before the 1991 Constitutional 
amendment, the fact is that urban municipalities across the country have, to varying 
degrees, been vested with a long list of functions under the various state municipal laws 
relating to public health, welfare, safety, regulation, and developmental activities. 
Functions relating to public health include water supply, sewers, sanitation, and waste 
disposal/management. Welfare activities include social justice, safeguarding the interests 
of weaker sections, creation and running of night shelters, street lighting, parks, education, 
burial grounds and cremation facilities, playgrounds, and recreation. Regulatory functions 
include prescribing and enforcing city plans, land use, and building by-laws, licensing of 
shops and establishments, removal of encroachments on public land, registration of births 
and deaths, and enforcing parking regulations. Public safety includes fire protection and 
street lighting. Public works include construction and maintenance of inner city roads and 
buildings. Development functions include town planning and development of markets. In 
addition to all this, the 74
th
 Constitutional amendment assigned additional development 
functions to municipal governments such as planning for development, urban poverty 
alleviation, protection of environment, and slum improvement and upgrading.  
 
 Recognizing that the scope and capacity to undertake various functions is, in fact, 
likely to vary with the size and character of the municipal body, many states have 
assigned significant powers with respect to education and healthcare, the regulation of 
industries, and the provision of intra-city and inter-city transportation services to larger 
cities. In some cases, independent service providers bypass the elected municipal 
governments—often precisely because of disenchantment with poor public service 
delivery by municipal bodies. In some areas water and sewer providers deliver services 
beyond the boundaries of one municipality to reap economies of scale. Independent 
service providers are often thought to insulate policy making from political vagaries, 
thereby providing better public service delivery. Problems with this type of 
organizational set up may arise from the agency‘s relative remoteness from the people it 
serves and its lack of political accountability. In drawing up agreements with such service 
providers, careful attention must be paid to balancing the desire for professional 
competence and least-cost provision against the need for local governments to be fully 
accountable to their residents for the provision of the public services for which they pay. 
 Ensuring clarity of assignment by specifying the responsibility of each level of 
government for service delivery is only part of the story. Clarity must be matched both by 
accountability to the local population and by authority in terms of the ability to manage 
expenditures and to determine (within limits) revenues. Financial honesty and political 
accountability require that municipal budgeting, financial reporting, and auditing should 
be not only comprehensive, comprehensible, comparable, verifiable, but also 
transparently public. In Brazil, for example, and increasingly in other countries, more and 
                                                 
5
 Such mapping was recommended by the Administrative Reforms Commission (India 2007) but as yet 
little has been done along these lines. 
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more local budgets and financial accounts are freely accessible on the Internet, and in 
some instances residents are actively encouraged to participate to some extent in 
developing the expenditure plans for their areas. However, little has been done along 
these lines in India. 
 Whether one goes this far or not, proper public expenditure management at any 
level of government must (a) adequately control the total level of revenue and 
expenditure, (b) appropriately allocate public resources among sectors and programs, and 
(c) ensure that governmental institutions operate as efficiently as possible. To do this, 
urban local governments need adequate authority to manage both the expenditure and 
revenue sides of their budgets, sufficient administrative capacity to be able to do so, and 
an appropriate incentive structure to encourage them to do so. Most Indian cities are 
handicapped in all these areas. Central and state governments need to provide a more 
adequate fiscal, financial, and institutional framework if municipal governments are to 
have even a chance to respond adequately to the problems facing them. Higher levels of 
government need to ensure that local officials are adequately trained and motivated to do 
their jobs properly. Central and state governments could usefully establish a model 
(framework) local budget law and financial reporting system and require adequate 
external audit. Improving the local budgeting and financial system along these lines will 
satisfy two essential requirements of good government by establishing the basis for 
financial control and providing reasonably accurate, uniform, comparable, and timely 
financial information.  
  None of these tasks is easy. For example, although improved accountability may 
be the key to improved public sector performance, improved information is the key to 
accountability. The systematic collection, analysis, and reporting of information that can 
be used to verify compliance with goals and to assist future decisions is critical to 
successful urban development. Such information is essential to informed local 
participation through the political process and to the monitoring of local activity by the 
central agencies responsible for supervising and (sometimes) financing such activity. 
Unless the relevant local ―publics‖ are aware of what is done, how well it is done, how 
much it cost, and who paid for it, no local constituency for effective government can be 
created. Similarly, unless higher-level agencies can monitor and evaluate local 
performance, there can be no assurance that functions of national importance will be 
adequately performed once they have been decentralized. An important underpinning and 
accompaniment of any successful program to strengthen urban local bodies must 
therefore be, perhaps paradoxically, an improvement in national evaluation capacity. 
Decentralization and improved central evaluation and assessment of local activities are 
not substitutes—they are complements.  
  One essential element of the hard budget constraint needed to induce efficient 
decisions by local governments in India is thus adequate central (and state) capacity in 
the shape of credible information-gathering and evaluation. Such ―carrots‖ of central 
financial support of local efforts as the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal 
Mission program (JNNURM; discussed below) need, at least implicitly, to be 
accompanied by the possible ―stick‖ of reduced support if performance is inadequate; and 
to shake a credible stick, one needs some standard of adequacy and some way of knowing 
how performance measures up. Decentralizing functions to local governments does not 
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imply that the central and state governments no longer have any responsibility. However, 
the nature of central (and state) responsibility changes from delivering the services 
themselves to regulating and monitoring the efficiency and equity of services delivered 
by local governments. The essential tool needed for this task is an adequate and up-to-
date information base—generated, for example, by requiring local governments to file 
uniform and informative budgets and financial and other reports. Unfortunately, this need 
for extended and reliable information on local public finances and service delivery has 
been sadly neglected in India. Unless a major effort to improve matters in this respect is 
undertaken soon, it is hard to see how the adequacy and quality of urban public services 
in most Indian cities can be maintained, let alone expanded and improved as the needs of 
development require.  
  Better financial oversight of local finances by state and even central officials is 
clearly necessary, not least because to a considerable extent local governments are 
spending state and central funds. However, devising and implementing a system of 
oversight that balances prudence with leaving the main decision-making powers at the 
local level is not a simple task. Both conceptually and empirically, it has proven difficult 
even in countries with excellent data to develop ways of measuring local financial 
performance that will provide adequate indications of possible local mismanagement and, 
more importantly, impending financial distress. It is important that much more effort and 
thought be put into developing and implementing a municipal financial reporting system 
that will be much more adequate in this regard than the present ―non-system.‖  
  In addition, if municipal governments are given more scope for making their own 
decisions on what to do, the fact is that some will undoubtedly make mistakes and in 
some instances perhaps even bankrupt (in some sense) a locality. While some such errors 
are undoubtedly an essential part of ―growing‖ a more adequate urban governance and 
finance structure, it is important that how such mistakes should be dealt with is 
considered carefully as part of the needed rethinking of how India‘s big cities in 
particular can and should be run more effectively and efficiently. Under what 
circumstances if at all, for example, should municipal governments be taken over by 
states? When a municipality cannot pay its debts or meet its current payroll, should it be 
rescued by a state agency and placed in some form of trusteeship until its financial 
position is again sustainable? Such questions are not easy to answer in general anywhere, 
but they must nonetheless be thought about much more carefully than appears to be the 
case today in any state. 
 
 5. Financing Urban Services: User Charges and Local Taxation 
 
An important rule of sound fiscal decentralization is that finances should follow functions 
(Bahl 2002). Local governments need access to adequate revenue sources to finance the 
public services they are mandated to provide. In India, it is clear that the lack of adequate 
resources is one key reason municipal bodies have not been able to provide satisfactory 
levels of the assigned public services.  
The poor state of urban infrastructure due to significant underfunding was the 
main motivation for initiating a central program—the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban 
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Renewal Mission (JNNURM)—with the aim of improving developmental incentives by 
linking grants for urban renewal to reforms at both state and local levels aimed at 
improving fiscal efficiency of the urban local bodies, freeing urban land and housing 
markets, and preventing the municipal bodies and the states from adopting protectionist 
policies. The first phase of JNNURM—as discussed further below—covers the period 
2005–12. After a slow start, the resources transferred from the centre picked up in the 
next few years. However, the slowdown of the economy following the global financial 
crisis—coupled with the political decision to provide particular stimulus to the 
commercial vehicle sector—led the central government both to dilute the reform 
requirements set out in the JNNURM program (e.g., to generate significant own 
resources by reforming property taxes and liberalizing land and housing markets) and to 
use a considerable portion of JNNURM funds to purchase buses for urban transport 
rather than for urban renewal as originally envisaged.  
Such changes in transfers matter a great deal since, by law, local governments in 
India cannot run deficits and are therefore required to restrict expenditures to available 
revenues. Municipal spending in India is extremely low because both own revenues and 
transfers from central and state governments are low. In 2001–02, for example, aggregate 
revenues of urban local bodies amounted to only 0.76 per cent of GDP, with about one-
third of this amount coming from transfers (Mohanty et al. 2007). Such figures are very 
low in comparison with countries like Brazil, where total municipal revenues account for 
7.4 per cent of GDP, municipal own revenues for 2.6 per cent, and municipal taxes for 
about 2 per cent (Afonso and Araujo 2006). Not surprisingly, the standards of municipal 
services in India are generally abysmal.  
 
(i) User Charges 
 
One important source of local finance should be from user charges imposed for services 
provided. To a considerable extent, a local government is like a business providing direct 
services in the form of what are  essentially private goods (like water) to its customers 
(local residents). Financing such services through user fees or charges not only provides 
funds with which to supply such services but also provides invaluable information on 
which services should be provided, in what quantity and quality, and to whom. Given the 
proximity to the population and the predominance of private good characteristics of many 
local services, levying user charges is feasible. Often, however, it appears to be 
politically impossible to levy user charges when the quality of the services rendered is 
poor. The result is that a vicious circle is set up, with low quality public services leading 
to an inability to collect user charges leading to further deterioration in the service levels. 
  This circle needs to be broken, and not only to get revenues to improve services. 
User charges are especially important as signals to consumers of the scarcity value of the 
services and to providers about the demands that need to be met through service 
provision. Establishing this strong link between demand and supply helps to generate 
resources and ensures efficiency in production and accountability in service delivery. 
User charges are particularly relevant for services such as water, sewers, electricity, 
garbage disposal, public transit, and recreation, and are hence generally most important in 
large metropolitan areas which provide more of such services.  
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At present, urban fees are not significant in India, with the proceeds from non-tax 
revenues from all urban local bodies amounting to a mere 0.13 per cent of GDP. Mohanty 
et al. (2007) show that in 10 large municipal corporations less than 10 per cent of the cost 
of providing services was recovered through fees; in another six, cost recovery was 
between 10 and 20 per cent. Only in two of the 25 municipal corporations examined was 
cost recovery greater than 75 per cent. Interestingly, cost recovery on the whole was 
relatively greater in those cities in which the estimated normative under-spending was 
lower. If low cost recovery and poor service quality are thus connected, it may prove 
possible to collect more user charges, especially if the quality of the services provided 
can be improved—for example, with the aid of a well-directed transfer system, as 
discussed in Section 6 below. 
Other important sources of non-tax revenues are licence fees for shops and 
establishments and parking fees. A common feature seen virtually in every urban area in 
India, particularly the largest cities, is the poor implementation of regulations relating to 
land use and commercial space occupation. The present system of issuing licences and 
the common flouting of regulations by shops and establishments provide enormous and 
highly undesirable rent-seeking opportunities for local officials. Public interest litigation 
relating to the construction and running of businesses in residential areas against the 
regulations led to the demolition of several shops and establishments in Delhi in 2005. In 
some cities, from time to time, the poor implementation of the regulations has been 
accompanied by periodic amnesties that legalise them after the fact, favouring in 
particular the politically well connected and powerful.  
Finally, parking fees in major metropolitan cities might be able to generate 
substantial revenues (Barter 2010). The main rationales for levying parking fees are to 
reduce congestion of vehicles on the roads and to generate resources to construct parking 
spaces. In most metropolitan cities in India the combination of the poor quality of the 
public transportation system, inadequate provision of parking spaces, and the present 
negligible charges for parking, whether legally or illegally, results in large-scale traffic 
congestion on roads. With sharp increases in household incomes and the emergence of a 
large middle class, the number of vehicles is going to increase sharply in the coming 
years. Introducing a more comprehensive policy of charging parking fees in accordance 
with the scarcity value of open spaces in cities should reduce traffic and at the same time 
generate revenues to construct multi-storeyed parking places—although neither objective 
may be achieved without much more rigorous enforcement of street parking regulations. 
Creating better parking infrastructure in the central business district of major 
metropolitan cities may perhaps be one appropriate area in which to explore the public-
private partnership (PPP) approach to capital finance discussed in Section 7 (and, as 
noted in Section 6, eligible for JNNURM assistance).  
 
(ii) Local Taxation 
 
Reliable and effective local taxation is essential to ensure hard budget constraints in 
financing local public goods (Oates 2005). In particular, it is important that local 
governments have adequate tax powers to ensure a strong linkage between revenue and 
expenditure decision at the margin (Bird and Smart 2010). As Bird and Slack (2007) 
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argue, the most appropriate tax at the local level is that on property, not only because real 
property is immobile but also because differences in service levels are reflected in 
property values so that the tax on real property is like a benefit tax. In many developed 
countries, income taxes generate significant revenues for local governments. However, it 
is unlikely that such taxes, even applied as supplemental rates to the central income tax, 
would make much sense in India given the problems in administering even the central tax, 
the intervening supervisory role of the states, and the extreme heterogeneity of Indian 
cities. A local payroll tax would perhaps be easier to administer, but it too is unlikely to 
be advisable in India in part because it creates a tax barrier to employment in the formal 
sector and may reduce the employment intensity of production. Another tax used at the 
local level in many countries is some form of sales or consumption tax, including 
selective taxes on, for example, entertainment services and hotels. Finally, a number of 
countries have local business taxes (Bird 2003). Most of these local business taxes 
involve significant exportation of tax burden to non-residents, are costly to administer, 
and impose substantial compliance burdens. Nonetheless, if Indian cities are to access 
additional tax revenues, some form of taxation on business and consumption may be 
worth further exploration. 
  
Indian municipal bodies can levy and collect only those taxes that are specified by 
the state governments from the list of taxes assigned to the states in the Constitution. 
Unsurprisingly, the taxing powers assigned are non-uniform across states. However, the 
most important local tax bases fall broadly within those indicated above as potentially 
useful: (a) taxes on lands and buildings, (b) a tax on the entry of goods into a local area 
for consumption, use, or sale, which is known as octroi, (c) taxes on luxuries including 
those on entertainment, amusement, betting and gambling, (d) taxes on advertisements 
other than those published in newspapers or broadcast on radio or television, (e) taxes on 
non-motorized vehicles, (f) taxes on animals and boats, (g) tolls, and (h) taxes on 
professions, trades, callings, and employment.  
In reality, however, most of these taxes are simply not levied in most urban areas. 
The most important tax actually levied at the local level is undoubtedly that on land and 
buildings (real properties). Octroi was an important source of municipal revenue in some 
states until recently. However, the tax was considered obnoxious, distorting, iniquitous, 
and a major source of corruption, and it is not surprising that all states except 
Maharashtra have now abolished the tax. Even in Maharashtra, the tax is levied only in 
municipal corporations and not by smaller cities. Some states replaced local octroi with 
an ―entry tax‖ at the state level—a tax which is not much better in economic terms and is 
also an impediment to internal trade. In most cases, even when states replaced octroi by 
entry tax, they did not compensate municipal governments for the loss of revenue. 
Generally, when states abolished octroi, they provided no alternative source of revenue 
and simply increased the size of the unfunded mandates confronting municipal 
governments. In a few states, however, municipal governments do have some limited 
access to consumption taxes. In Kerala, for instance, the power to levy an entertainment 
tax is given to the urban local governments. In Andhra Pradesh, local governments 
receive a fixed share of the revenue from entertainment tax. In a few states, urban local 
bodies also collect some revenue from advertisement tax.  
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The property tax is by far the most important source of own revenues of 
municipal bodies although collections are generally poor and the revenue buoyancy of the 
tax is low. Recently, however, initiatives in some municipal corporations have shown that 
revenues from this tax can be substantially increased with strong local leadership and 
proper reform of the tax system. Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (BBMP; Greater 
Bangalore Municipal Corporation), for example, reformed its property tax by revising the 
area-based values, introducing a self-assessment system and improving the technology of 
the payments system with the result that revenue increased from Rs. 4400 million in 
2007–08 to Rs. 7800 million in 2008–09 and increased still further the following year.  
The starting point for property tax reform in India was the introduction of area- 
based assessment by the Patna Municipal Corporation in 1992–93. Previously, the tax 
was collected on the basis of the annual rental value, defined as gross annual value rent at 
which the property may be reasonably be expected to be rented. This system gave 
enormous discretion to tax collectors and yielded little in tax revenue. The prescription of 
unit values (per square foot) based on the area of location and type of construction of the 
property instead of the annual rental value removed most discretion from the tax 
collectors and resulted in such a large increase in base that the tax rate was reduced from 
44 per cent to 9 per cent.
6
 Subsequently, municipal corporations in a number of states 
adopted the Patna model. In Bangalore, for example, properties are classified into 
different zones based on the guidance values set by the Department of Stamps and 
Registration. For each zone, rental value per square foot was determined on the basis of 
type and quality of construction and age of the buildings. A handbook was brought out 
detailing these values so that each individual property owner can now compute his tax 
liability simply by plugging in the location, type of construction, and area of his property, 
and then pay the tax online. Similar reforms in other urban local bodies might reasonably 
be able to double their (low) revenues from property tax.  
 A major weakness of this system is the need to revise the unit values periodically 
in keeping with changes in prices. In the absence of periodic revision revenues will not 
respond to changes in the values of properties, and the buoyancy of the tax will depend 
only upon the addition of new properties. As a rule, it is politically difficult to change 
values periodically. One way to overcome this problem and keep tax revenues expanding 
with needs might be to link the guided values automatically to the index of property 
values in various cities determined by the National Housing Bank. This system could be 
expanded if states would initiate the estimation of price changes on real property in every 
urban local body based on the methodology adopted by the National Housing Bank and 
then link the guided values automatically to the price index to estimate the tax liability.  
Several important lessons from the Bangalore experiment in the reform of 
property tax are worth noting. First, the system should be simple and transparent enough 
to be easily understood by the general public. Second, there should be clarity in the 
reform process and thorough public discussion and debate when the reform is adopted. It 
is important for the tax department to provide prompt and clear answers to queries by the 
general public through newspapers, radio, and television as well as through so-called 
                                                 
6
 In view of the very considerable degree of under-spending in Patna—the worse of the 30 cities examined 
by Mohanty et al. (2007)—its pioneering role in property tax reform has apparently not been carried 
through over time in a way that sustains municipal revenues. 
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―social media‖ when appropriate.  It is also important to facilitate online payment of the 
tax so that the taxpayer does not have to be in contact with the tax collector. Computation 
of the property tax liability based on the guided values and online payment of the tax 
obviates the need for taxpayers to go to the tax department and face harassment simply in 
order to pay the tax. This kind of direct, simple action to simplify and improve local 
fiscal procedures is needed to enable Indian cities to cope more adequately with their 
changing reality. 
Another major reform needed in the property tax system is the expansion of the 
tax base. The Administrative Reforms Commission (India 2007) noted that only about 
60–70 per cent of properties in urban areas are actually assessed. A large number of 
property owners simply do not pay the tax. The Commission recommended matching the 
properties paying the tax with those in the Geographical Information System (GIS) to 
identify those that are not paying the tax. BBMP has undertaken this exercise for all 
properties within its 800 sq. kilometre area. By matching the actual properties paying the 
tax, excluding government buildings and slums, it is possible to identify the properties 
evading the tax. The Bangalore experiment is worth replicating in other municipal 
corporations and municipalities. 
Widespread evasion exists in part because much of the new construction as well 
as additions to existing buildings have been done without getting proper approval. Some 
have expressed the fear that allowing such properties to pay the tax could mean giving 
them legal recognition. It is important to keep these two issues separate. It is also 
important to examine the nature of violations. In general, if violations are not major, 
property owners should be allowed to pay the penalty and regularise them.
7
 On the other 
hand, in cases where the violations are major, the structures should be demolished.  
Apart from the property tax, which is potentially a good source of local revenues 
but definitely needs reform, larger cities in particular are likely to need some additional 
broad-based tax source, such as a supplemental rate ―piggybacked‖ on a national or state 
tax and administered with that tax, but with the proceeds going to the local government. 
Any such local rates should be set within predetermined limits. A ceiling is needed to 
prevent localities from exporting tax burdens (in excess of benefits received) to non-
residents and a floor to prevent richer areas from ―stealing‖ tax base from poorer areas.  
In India, if the central income tax were a broader, simpler, and more effectively 
administered tax than at present, perhaps state and even some larger local governments 
might be allowed to piggyback their rates subject to a ceiling rate. Such a system would 
reduce the scope for evasion and avoidance of income tax, provide a stable source of 
revenues to both state and local governments and, in particular, ensure that large business 
and manufacturing centres like Mumbai have the funds to maintain and upgrade their 
infrastructure to sustain their key role in India‘s national economic dynamism. However, 
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Recently the government of Karnataka state attempted to pass an ordinance regularising 700,000 
illegal constructions within the Bangalore Municipal Corporation area on the eve of an election to the 
municipal body. The scheme (called the ―Akrama-Sakrama‖ scheme) was approved by the state cabinet but 
in the end did not receive the approval of the Governor on the grounds that the government should pass the 
legislation and not simply pass an ordinance. 
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before such measures can be considered many changes would have take place not only at 
the constitutional level but also, equally importantly, in terms of political willingness to 
tax adequately and properly at all levels of government.  
Another possibility might be a surcharge on the consumption tax as an additional 
source of revenue for municipal governments. As with the income tax, however, for such 
measures to be considered there would first have to be a more or less uniform sales tax 
base at both the central and state levels, something which has not yet been achieved, 
although considerable progress has been made in this direction. Interestingly, even in the 
present (incomplete) transition to a ―dual‖ central and state goods and services tax (GST), 
Gujarat recently decided to impose an additional one percentage point levy on the sales 
tax, earmarking the levy as compensation to the municipal corporations for the loss of 
revenue from abolishing octroi. As the present consumption tax system is replaced by the 
GST regime, the possibility of providing additional revenue to local governments more 
generally by (as in Japan, for example) levying an additional percentage point for this 
purpose at the central level or perhaps as each state decides and then distributing the 
revenues to localities by formula might perhaps be considered.
8
 Firm estimates of GST 
base are not available but a conservative estimate made at the National Institute of Public 
Finance and Policy (NIPFP) for 2007–08 put the GST base at Rs. 16,000 billion after 
adjusting for the prevailing exemptions (Rao and Chakraborty, 2010). A 1 per cent levy 
on this base would yield Rs. 160 billion for municipal governments, which is about 0.34 
per cent of GDP. Since even the most optimistic estimate of revenue from property tax is 
just about 0.2 per cent of GDP (Mathur, Thakur and Rajyadhyaksha, 2009), a 1 per cent 
levy on the GST could yield virtually double the amount collected from property tax. 
This possible important source of revenue deserves serious consideration.  
 
 As a final note on local taxes, it is particularly important that states cease the 
pernicious practice of abolishing local taxes without providing adequate substitute 
sources of revenue to municipalities. For example, the Gujarat government abolished 
octroi to fulfil its election promise without any mechanism to compensate the municipal 
corporations, although later they decided to levy a one percentage point additional rate on 
the sales tax. Rajasthan and Haryana simply abolished the property tax without even 
consulting the urban local governments. Punjab put the threshold for the property tax so 
high that almost two-thirds of the properties are exempted. Since the property tax is the 
only important tax for municipal governments, when a state government abolishes or 
severely restricts this tax, it is deliberately disempowering its municipalities. 
 
                                                 
8
 Conceivably, some states may perhaps even want to consider allowing at least the large metropolitan 
areas to impose (piggyback) an additional rate of their own on the state tax base but this is unlikely to be a 
good idea given the complexities involved in making such a system work. Even Canada, which makes 
considerable use of such provincial supplementary rates on its central GST as described in detail in Bird 
and Gendron (2010), has not considered, and is unlikely to consider, extending this facility below the level 
of the province.  
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6. Financing Urban Services: Intergovernmental Transfers 
 
In principle, municipal governments should raise revenues from their residents to finance 
local public services. In most countries, however, municipalities are seldom able to 
generate the required revenues from their own source. Transfers from higher levels of 
government either by way of tax devolution or grants are therefore found in every 
country, as are specific purpose transfers intended to ensure minimum standards of 
services for those with significant benefit spillovers.  
 
(i) General Grants 
 
In India, state governments are constitutionally required to appoint a State Finance 
Commission (SFC) every five years to determine the measures needed to improve the 
financial position of the municipalities, including the distribution between the state 
government and the municipalities of state revenues and the allocation of such proceeds 
between municipalities at all levels, the revenues that may be assigned to or utilized by 
municipalities, and the grants-in-aid to municipalities from state funds. Since the 1991 
Constitutional amendment, the Central Finance Commission (CFC), which reports every 
five years), has also been obligated to make recommendations on measures needed to 
augment state funds in order for states to be able to supplement municipal resources as 
recommended by the respective SFC. As yet, however, the CFC has not done so, 
essentially because most SFC reports have not been made available on a timely basis or 
have been unusable, either because they were not accepted for implementation by the 
states or because the methodology employed was not only not uniform but also left much 
to be desired. As the Twelfth Finance Commission (India 2004) noted, even when the 
recommendations of the SFCs were accepted by the governments, they were not fully 
implemented in letter or spirit and the annual budgetary allocations were often well short 
of the recommendations. Moreover, the SFCs often did not have the expertise or time to 
undertake the technical exercises required to estimate the requirements of the 
municipalities, even if the necessary information and data existed, which was almost 
never the case. In short, the presumed goal of providing an objective and scientific basis 
for state transfers to municipalities through the device of the SFC has not been achieved. 
Most state transfers to municipalities are ad hoc—often based simply on past trends—
inadequate, opaque, and often discretionary. After transfers, as before, urban local bodies 
are left with large unfunded mandates and woefully inadequate public services. 
 
 Moreover, since the CFCs have been unable to take account of the 
recommendations of the SFCs, they have usually simply set an essentially arbitrary and 
token amount for municipal grants in their recommendations. For instance, the Eleventh 
Finance Commission recommended a grant of Rs. 20 billion for the five-year period 
2000–05 and the Twelfth Finance Commission recommended Rs. 50 billion grants to 
urban local bodies for 2005–10. In short, both central and state block transfers to urban 
local governments are wholly inadequate and bear no relationship to expenditure needs. 
Major revisions are needed if central-state-municipal fiscal transfers are to play a 
meaningful role in empowering India‘s cities to achieve their development potential. 
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(ii) Specific Purpose Grants 
 
Most specific purpose grants come from central government ministries. As noted above, 
the major specific purpose central transfer for urban local bodies is the Jawaharlal Nehru 
Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) under which grants are given to upgrade the urban 
infrastructure on the condition that the states and the municipalities will undertake 
reforms. This ambitious program, intended to augment urban infrastructure and services, 
is linked to a reform agenda that includes doing away with urban land ceiling act and rent 
control act as well as reforms in property tax. Rs. 500 billion is to be allocated from 
central funds during 2006–12, with matching contributions from city and state 
governments. Track I of JNNURM assistance is to flow to 63 identified cities to enable 
planned development, ensure integrated development of urban infrastructure, and ensure 
provision of urban services to the poor. Under Track II, assistance will be extended to 
other cities under two programs—Urban Infrastructure Development Schemes for Small 
and Medium Towns (UIDSSMT) and Integrated Housing and Slum Development 
Programmes (IHSDP).  
 
 Admissible components for assistance under JNNURM include urban renewal, 
sewerage and water supply, solid waste management, storm water drainage, urban 
transport, parking spaces on PPP basis, development of heritage areas, prevention and 
rehabilitation of soil erosion, and preservation of water bodies. Among the municipal 
level reforms associated with JNNURM financing are introduction of an accrual based 
accounting system, reform of the property tax by using GIS information, levying user 
charges to recover 100 per cent of operation and maintenance charges, provision of basic 
services to urban poor, and internal earmarking of budgets for this purpose. State-level 
reforms under JNNURM include enactment of public disclosure law, full implementation 
of the provisions of 74
th
 Constitutional amendment including the setting up of District 
Planning Committees and Metropolitan Planning Committees, enactment of community 
participation laws, associating elected representatives with the function of city planning, 
repeal of the urban land ceiling act and reform of the rent control act, and rationalization 
of the stamp duty to bring it down to no more than 5 per cent within the next five years. 
In addition, optional reforms relate to revision of by-laws, simplification of legal and 
procedural frameworks for conversion of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes, 
earmarking 20–25 per cent of developed land for economically weaker sections of the 
population, introduction of computerized process of registration of real properties, 
making water harvesting mandatory in all buildings and by-laws to introduce recycling of 
water, encouraging public-private partnerships, and sundry structural and administrative 
reforms. The grant and loan portions and the matching ratios for the centre, state, and 
local bodies (including parastatals and financial institutions) are shown in the following 
table. 
 Coping with Change: The Need to Restructure Urban Governance and Finance in India 23 
 
 
 
Financing Pattern for JNNURM 
(Per Cent of Total Project Cost) 
Urban Infrastructure and Governance 
Funding Pattern 
Grant ULB/Parastatals/Loan 
from Financial 
Institutions 
Centre State 
Cities with more than 4 million population 35 15 50 
Cities with more than one million but less 
than 4 million population 
50 20 30 
Cities in North Eastern States and Jammu 
and Kashmir 
90 10 - 
Other Cities 80 10 10 
Setting up desalination plants 80 10 10 
 
 JNNURM is clearly a comprehensive specific purpose scheme for urban renewal 
and infrastructure support intended to foster many of the reforms in urban governance 
and finance discussed earlier. Indeed, it is in all likelihood too comprehensive and might 
perhaps have been more effectively focused on a shorter and more easily attainable list of 
objectives. In reality, however, little has happened so far since states have proved 
reluctant to undertake the reforms required to access the assistance. In the first year 
(2005–06) of operation, only 15.6 per cent of the grants estimated in the budget were 
allocated. In the second year, although the estimated outlay increased to 78 per cent of 
budget, the total amount disbursed was still less than Rs. 36 billion. However, with the 
onset of the financial crisis in 2008–09, disbursements increased sharply. Unfortunately, 
this increase was achieved in part by diluting the reform content of the package, for 
example, by using the funds to purchases buses as part of the fiscal stimulus to the 
commercial vehicles sector. Putting more buses on already overcrowded urban streets 
may well increase rather than reduce congestion and other on-going urban management 
problems. Just as the states have been reluctant to undertake the pro-market reforms 
called for by JNNURM, the centre has, regrettably, proved too ready to use the funds 
committed for purposes other than those originally intended.  
 
7. Financing Urban Infrastructure 
 
For India‘s cities to play the role they should in the country‘s future development, 
considerable investment will be needed in urban infrastructure. Even if tax and user 
charge reforms increase the resources required for basic urban public services and 
maintenance expenditures as discussed in Section 5, substantial improvements in urban 
infrastructure will require resources well beyond the capacity of even the best run urban 
local bodies to generate. Major capital works in urban areas in other countries are often 
financed at least in part from central funds, and correctly so to the extent that some of the 
benefits from such works may be felt nationally as well as locally. The major effects of 
urban infrastructure projects, however, are clearly local and the main benefits are reaped 
by local residents (including local businesses as well as households) usually through 
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capitalization in local property values. It thus seems only right that much of the cost 
should be substantially borne by local residents.  
 
Four ways to finance major capital expenditures are discussed briefly here: local 
borrowing; levying developmental charges in the residents; selling land and other assets; 
and public-private partnerships.  
 
(i) Borrowing 
 
When the benefits from infrastructure projects are enjoyed over a period of time, it may 
be both fair and efficient to finance such projects in part or whole by borrowing. 
Moreover, borrowing may be the only practical way to finance large capital projects 
without large and undesirable fluctuations in local tax rates from year to year. However, 
municipalities in India can contract loans only if they are permitted to do so by the state 
government.
9
 In most cases, state governments have to guarantee local borrowings, in 
which case the loan becomes the liability of the state and is included in the overall ceiling 
under the respective fiscal responsibility legislations. States are reluctant to guarantee 
municipal bonds because their fiscal responsibility legislation requires them to limit their 
committed liabilities to 0.5 per cent of Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) and their 
fiscal deficit at 3 per cent of GSDP.
10
 Municipal corporations must thus issue bonds on 
the strength of their own credit rating rather than based on state government guarantees.  
  
State governments permit urban local governments to borrow under their 
respective municipal laws, which lay down the framework for borrowing: the projects for 
which the borrowing is allowed, the volume of borrowing and the security to be pledged, 
the procedure for applying to the state for the permission to borrow, and the manner in 
which accounts must be kept. If local bodies borrow without state government guarantees, 
generally they must place some revenue stream in escrow in order to guarantee the 
service of the debt. In most cases, state governments only allow municipal corporations 
to borrow from the market based on the value of their real property tax base. Most states 
have issued guidelines for local borrowing, such as borrowing should be for less than 30 
years, the interest rate should not exceed interest rate on government securities, and there 
should be sufficient provisioning for debt servicing.  
 
                                                 
9
 Under Article 293 of the Constitution, even state governments have to seek the permission of the central 
government to borrow if they are indebted to the latter. The pattern of plan financing until 2004–05, when 
much plan assistance was given to the states in the form of central loans, ensured that states were indeed 
usually so indebted. Consequently, when states borrow from the market in effect the Union Finance 
Ministry, Planning Commission, and the Reserve Bank of India really determine the allocation of market 
borrowing to each state. 
10
 The 3 per cent GSDP target recommended by the Twelfth Finance Commission was supposed to be 
reached by 2009–10. However, the Government of India raised the fiscal deficit limit to 3.5 per cent and 
later to 4 per cent of GSDP in 2008–09 as a part of its fiscal stimulus package, and many states revised 
their targets accordingly. The Twelfth Finance Commission also recommended that states should enact 
fiscal responsibility legislation; 28 states (with the most important exception being West Bengal) have done 
so.  
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Only recently have municipal corporations accessed funds from the capital market. 
By and large, most such borrowing has been from public institutions such as Housing and 
Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) or Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) for 
housing and water supply schemes. After Credit Rating Information Services Ltd. 
(CRISIL) began rating municipal corporations in 1996, however, the groundwork 
necessary for the municipal bond market was established. Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation was the first municipal entity to issue Rs. 1 billion bond with the credit 
rating of ―A+‖. Subsequently, other credit rating agencies began to rate municipal 
corporations and a number of municipal corporations have issued bonds, particularly after 
the Ministry of Urban Development issued guidelines for tax-free municipal bonds. The 
critical requirement for issuance of such bonds is that the municipal corporation issuing 
the bonds is required to maintain a debt-service coverage ratio of at least 1.25 throughout 
the period.
 11
  
 
Despite these developments, not much has happened in the municipal bond 
market in India. The volume of bonds issued has been small and trading very thin. In total, 
only nine municipal corporations have so far issued bonds amounting to Rs. 6.2 billion, 
in part because few can fulfil the collaterization condition mentioned above. Although so 
far the amount of resources raised from the bond market by the municipal corporations is 
small, all bonds were issued on their own strength and not based on state government 
guarantee, with the exception of those issued by Bangalore Municipal Corporation and 
Indore Municipal Corporation. So long as there is no state bailout, as time goes on the 
demonstration effect may lead to still more municipal recourse to borrowing for capital 
finance. The regulations of the JNNURM program provide another impetus for widening 
and deepening the bond market: the centre and states together will provide 50 per cent of 
the resources required for investment in urban infrastructure as grants if the municipal 
corporation can generate or borrow the other 50 per cent. Further development of the 
municipal bond market could increase the flexibility of urban finance in the future. 
 
(ii) Development Charges 
 
One way to finance basic urban infrastructure, particularly in new areas being developed, 
is to levy development charges based on the land area being developed. A development 
charge is a one-time levy imposed on property developers (including Development 
Authorities) to finance growth-related capital costs for the area where the development 
takes place. The objective is to finance the infrastructure associated with the new 
development project by taxing those who are presumed to benefit directly in the form of 
increased property values owing to the new infrastructure.. Generally, developers recover 
the amount by charging the property owners based on the land area owned by them in the 
new development project. Who ultimately bears the cost of course depends on the 
demand and supply conditions for land and housing in the area. On the whole, however, 
in view of the relative scarcity of land and the strong demand for land and houses in 
urban areas in India, most development charges are probably ultimately borne by the 
buyers. When well designed and implemented, development charges in effect amount to a 
                                                 
11
 Debt-service coverage ratio is defined as the ratio of net income (after meeting all obligations) to long 
term debt service obligations. 
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form of marginal cost pricing of urban infrastructure and may thus encourage more 
orderly and efficient development of urban agglomerations.  
 
 Such charges are feasible in newly developed areas within urban agglomerations. 
However, in practice in places where parallel Development Authorities exist with the 
mandate of creating housing infrastructure, the charges are collected by them and not by 
the municipal bodies. From the perspective of sensible urban finance and planning it is 
unfortunate that these Authorities are directly responsible to the respective state 
governments and not to the municipal body concerned.
12
 Dividing up capital and 
operational functions and finances in this way evidently makes it more difficult to 
develop coherent urban policies.  
 
(iii) Proceeds from Sale of Land and Buildings 
 
On the face of it, land for housing and for commercial purposes is scarce in all urban 
areas, given the high growth of urban population. In many urban agglomerations, as just 
mentioned, Development Authorities have been set up to acquire land and to develop it 
either for sale or to directly build affordable houses for the poor and middle-income 
groups.
13
 They acquire land from the private owners, mostly agricultural land in the 
surrounding areas, put the basic infrastructure in place, and then sell the ‗improved‘ land 
for housing or commercial building purposes. Generally, they generate considerable 
surpluses which could be used to improve infrastructure and services in municipal areas. 
 
  Despite the frequent complaints that land for housing and commercial purposes 
in most cities are scarce, there is in fact often considerable land  potentially available in 
urban areas, much of it owned by public sector agencies such as railways and defence as 
well as by municipal bodies themselves. An essential first step is to make a complete 
inventory of land potentially available for development and sale in municipal areas. Once 
this is done, it may be possible to develop such lands, sell them, and use the proceeds to 
finance urban infrastructure. In the case of the defence sector, for example, the 
cantonments that were created were initially outside cities. However, as cities expanded 
over the years, they have come within the urban agglomeration. Cantonments run their 
own systems of service delivery, including schools and hospitals, and could certainly be 
located outside the city limits, reducing the risk to the safety of civilians at the same time. 
The central government, with co-operation from the state governments, should take 
action to relocate such establishments, with the state government or the municipal 
corporation paying for the cost of land acquisition and redevelopment. The relocation of 
defence establishments could release large chunks of land and thus help reduce 
skyrocketing real estate prices. The proceeds from the sale of these properties can be used 
for redevelopment of defence establishments outside the city, and any surplus revenue 
earmarked for augmenting urban infrastructure and services.  
 
                                                 
12
 The Delhi Development Authority until recently was not even accountable to the Delhi State 
administration but was under the Union Home Ministry.  
13
 In some instances, however, the Development Authority has ended up acting as a monopoly agency, thus 
restricting the supply of housing in cities and defeating its original purpose.  
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Much the same holds for vacant land belonging to other agencies which could 
also, after proper development, be disposed of and the proceeds shared between the 
municipal body and other owners. When the development of infrastructure by the 
municipality increases the capital value of such land, any gains realized through sale 
should be shared with the municipality. Of course, all these issues are contentious, and 
consensus on them will not be easy to achieve. Nonetheless, if centre and state 
governments can cooperate, it should certainly be possible to work out an acceptable 
formula for sharing the proceeds from the sale of land that would provide some needed 
infrastructure finance to growing cities.  
 
(iv) Public-Private Partnerships 
 
In India‘s complex public sector it may often be so difficult to get different components 
of the public sector to cooperate that a better approach may be to deal with the private 
sector. Indeed, public-private partnerships (PPPs) may have significant potential for 
financing and delivery of urban services. For example, the private sector may be asked to 
contribute funds for specified services in return for certain rights or future incomes. There 
are many services such as water supply sewerage, solid waste management, recreational 
facilities, rain water harvesting, and urban transportation where public-private 
partnerships are eminently feasible in principle. 
  
Indeed, PPPs have a number of potential advantages in delivering urban public 
services. First, the urban local government does not have to spend the money up front. 
Second, contracting out services may result in greater efficiency as better service delivery. 
Empirical studies show that contracting out generally results in lowering of unit costs of 
services (Kitchen 2002). Chennai was the first city in India to initiate contracting out 
municipal solid waste management services to a foreign private agency, ONYX, a 
Singapore-based company. The scope of privatization includes activities such as 
sweeping, collection, storing, transporting of municipal solid waste, and creating public 
awareness in three municipal zones. ONYX collects about 1100 metric tons of waste 
from three zones per day and transports it to open dumps. This experiment holds a lot of 
promise for other municipal corporations and municipalities as well. A number of other 
municipalities have contracted out waste disposal and solid waste management to the 
private sector, including to NGOs.  
 
Another successful example is in the provision of water supply in Hubli-Dharwar, 
Belgaum, and Gulbarga cities of Karnataka State. Residents of these cities used to get 
water supply for only one or two hours a day. However, the PPP arrangement, undertaken 
on a pilot basis to cover about 200,000 residents in the three cities, enabled them to enjoy 
the benefits of a continuous water supply with a state of the art water distribution system 
and at little additional cost. The private partner in this case is a French water company, 
Veolia Water, which was entrusted with the task of providing 100 per cent metered 
customer connections. The responsibility for providing adequate supply of bulk water 
was entrusted to the Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board (KUWSDB). 
Considering the enormous success of this pilot, Karnataka government has approved 
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upscaling of the project to the entire population in the three cities (Ahluwalia and Nair 
2010).  
 
 Mixed public-private financing of urban infrastructure definitely deserves to be 
further explored in the Indian context. At the same time, care must be taken to ensure that 
certain conditions are satisfied if this approach is to produce beneficial results (Engel et al. 
2010). This approach is most likely to prove successful when projects are carefully 
designed and implemented, and when the responsible public agencies are technically and 
financially able to hold up their end of the deal. Weak governments cannot rely on private 
agents to overcome their weaknesses and expect to make the best possible bargains for 
the public they represent. Governments must also be careful that they do not end up 
assuming thedownside risk of projects, while allowing their private partners to reap any 
upside gains. Similarly, care must be exerted to ensure that what occurs is not simply the 
replacement of public sector borrowing by (often more expensive) private sector 
borrowing. Privatizing the design, construction, and operation of urban infrastructure 
may have many merits if done properly, but it is neither a panacea nor free.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
Cities are the central drivers of growth the world over: they are the leading edge of 
economic dynamism. However, the extent to which cities fulfil this role by promoting 
competition, galvanising innovation, and accelerating growth depends critically on the 
nature, adequacy and flexibility of urban governance and finance. Adequate finance is 
necessary to ensure satisfactory standards of infrastructure and services, and finance 
needs to be flexible enough to accommodate sometimes rapid changes in circumstances. 
Governance systems determine not only the allocative and technical efficiency of 
spending but also the responsiveness and accountability with which services are actually 
delivered. Good policies, efficient and responsive local governance systems, and sound 
arrangements to finance public services are thus all critical elements in sustainable urban 
development. They shape the nature and quality of public services provided as well as the 
structure of incentives and accountability.  
This paper identifies a number of reforms needed in India‘s urban governance and 
finance to ensure competitive standards of urban public services and effective governance 
systems that are responsive, efficient, and effective. Clearly, no one system of urban 
governance is likely to work equally well for all urban local bodies. The governance 
system adopted should vary with the size of the urban local body and the nature of the 
institutions in the area where that body is located. It can be particularly important from a 
national perspective, for instance, for the largest cities to be somewhat insulated from 
localized and parochial biases by being made more independent of states. Moreover, 
emphasis should be put on developing governance system in cities that promote 
cosmopolitanism and accommodative policies to promote healthy social and economic 
interactions.  
All Indian cities now suffer from many problems: ambiguous expenditure 
assignment (including independent and higher-level agencies operating under different 
mandates), inadequate attention to critical issues of public finance management, poorly 
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developed institutions and mechanisms for participatory planning, and inadequate and 
poorly implemented resources with respect to own source revenues, intergovernmental 
transfers, and methods of financing needed for urban infrastructure development. 
Solutions to most of these problems are not hard to find in the literature, by looking at 
experience elsewhere, and by considering local innovative actionsalready seen in a few 
cities in India.. Such solutions range from essential reforms in the property tax system 
and adequate exploitation of user charges and fees for various services delivered through 
reformed central and state transfers to more imaginative exploitation of various possible 
ways to finance urban infrastructure. To achieve much success with such reforms, 
however, what is needed is stronger urban leadership and, especially, fundamental 
changes to governance structures, such as the effective use of State Finance Commissions 
and the implementation of many of the reforms set out in the JNNURMM program.  
Such reforms in urban governance and finance are critical for improving the 
quality of life of the people living in urban areas and ensuring that India‘s cities, and 
especially its large metropolitan areas, realize their potential as key drivers of economic 
growth rather than being, too often, places whose crowded and potholed streets and lack 
of clean water and other amenities make development unattractive. If India‘s rate of 
economic growth is to be sustained and even increased in the face of continuing 
economic, political, and environmental uncertainty, much closer attention to reforming 
urban policies, encouraging urban initiative, and improving urban outcomes is necessary.  
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